

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1



23 April 1962

Copy No. C

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1

DIA AND DOS HAVE NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE.

DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006300300001-8

Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006300300001-8

23 April 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

[Redacted Box]

25X1

2. USSR: Khrushchev declares willingness to meet President Kennedy again. (Page ii)
3. Congo: Acting UN chief optimistic about resumption of Tshombé-Adoula talks. (Page ii)
4. Syria: Prime minister's statement reflects leftist pressures. (Page iii)
5. Greece: Political atmosphere likely to remain "very heated." (Page iii)
6. USSR-Iraq: Three Soviet subchasers apparently en route to Iraq. (Page iv)
7. USSR - Communist China: Trade talks apparently continuing. (Page iv)
8. Warsaw Pact: First combined maneuvers in Hungary since 1956 revolt. (Page v)
9. Yugoslavia-USSR: Gromyko ends five-day visit. (Page v)

25X1

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

23 April 1962

DAILY BRIEF

25X1

25X1

i

25X1

25X1

USSR: [Khrushchev told [redacted] on 20 April that he would be willing to meet President Kennedy again--preferably in a neutral country, since "past Soviet wounds" were not sufficiently healed to make this the best time for the President to visit Moscow. Khrushchev remarked that in contrast to the Vienna meeting last June, a new meeting would have to produce concrete agreements. He said he saw a glimmer of hope for a Berlin agreement but declared that Western forces must withdraw or at least give up their occupation status. There have been other recent indications that the USSR will not insist on the withdrawal of Western forces if the West will agree to a new status for West Berlin which terminates the "occupation regime." The Soviets, however, may press for a time limit and ceilings on Western troops remaining in West Berlin.]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Congo: [Acting UN chief Khiari, who has been a close adviser and a strong supporter of Adoula, told Ambassador Gullion on 21 April that he expects Adoula to make some gesture toward resumption of negotiations with Tshombé. Adoula now is back in Leopoldville; Tshombé has informed UN Congo chief Gardiner that he will return also for further talks when Gardiner comes back later this week from New York.]

[Khiari was optimistic about Adoula's chances of weathering the immediate political storm provoked by last week's incident, but doubted that further talks, at least under present circumstances,]

23 Apr 62

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

25X1

would gain Tshombé's assent to any meaningful reintegration of Katanga. The UN official thought that mounting domestic pressure would finally force Adoula to seek bilateral assistance from radical African states--he specified Egypt and Ghana--and to carry out his threat of asking UN withdrawal. Khiari, who apparently is not aware of the plan now under consideration to have UN forces support a move by the central government to collect taxes in Katanga on mineral exports, said he saw no solution without the use of force. He indicated that in order to stimulate useful negotiations and quiet Adoula's critics, he favored allowing the Congolese Army to undertake new initiatives in northern Katanga.]

25X1

25X1

Syria: Prime Minister Azmah's 21 April general policy statement, while avowing an interest in encouraging private capital, reflects the socialistic and pan-Arab pressures which induced the army to overthrow the conservative parliamentary regime three weeks ago. Azmah emphasized the necessity for state-directed economic planning and the limitation of private capital investment. The prime minister announced the re-nationalization of Syria's largest industrial combine and his intention to reinstitute the agrarian reform law decreed by Nasir during the union with Egypt. With respect to inter-Arab relations, Azmah emphasized Syria's close ties with "sister Egypt" and endorsed the standard goals of Arab unity, support for liberation movements throughout the world, and the "liquidation" of imperialism in Asia and Africa.

25X1

Greece: The non-Communist opposition appears to have been encouraged by the response so far to the campaign of public demonstrations it launched last month in an attempt to force the King to install a caretaker cabinet and call new parliamentary elections. They may be further encouraged by the rioting and publicity which

23 Apr 62

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

25X1

developed in connection with such a demonstration in Athens on 20 April, even though the handling of the situation by the Greek security forces is likely to redound to the government's credit. The American Embassy believes that the general political atmosphere is likely to remain "very heated" in the immediate future. [] (Backup, Page 1)

25X1

USSR-Iraq: [] Soviet subchasers of the SO-I class, now under tow in the Mediterranean Sea, apparently are being delivered to Iraq. The SO-I is a small ship of recent design carrying four five-tube antisubmarine rocket launchers mounted on the bow. Ships of this class have not previously been delivered to a nonbloc country. []

25X1

[] Moscow has previously supplied Baghdad with [] motor torpedo boats and [] auxiliary vessels. Since 1958, the USSR has agreed to supply Iraq with more than [] worth of military equipment and training, about three fourths of which has been delivered. The most recent Soviet-Iraqi arms deal, which was signed last September, included aircraft, missiles, and land armaments. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

USSR - Communist China: The deputy chief and some members of the Soviet delegation which signed a 1962 trade pact with Communist China on 20 April are remaining in Peiping. They probably will discuss the status of Soviet deliveries of equipment for complete plants--a program severely disrupted since mid-1960. Similar negotiations went on for two months after conclusion of the 1961 trade agreement, resulting in adjustments which formalized the curtailment of Soviet aid to China and established a framework for limited deliveries of equipment on a pay-as-you-go basis. Any current talks are unlikely to produce significant changes in Sino-Soviet economic relations; at most, completion of some partially finished projects may be arranged for. []

23 Apr 62

DAILY BRIEF

iv

25X1

25X1

Warsaw Pact: The recently concluded exercises involving Soviet, Hungarian, and Rumanian troops are the first combined maneuvers by these three countries since the Hungarian revolt in 1956. Hungarian participation points up the progress made in the reconstitution of the Hungarian Army. Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Malinovsky, Warsaw Pact commander Marshal Grechko, and Rumanian Defense Minister General Salajan "participated," according to the Budapest press. [The extent of Rumanian deployment into Hungary is not known, but elements of a Soviet tank division and a Hungarian infantry division were maneuvering in the Lake Balaton area of western Hungary between 9 and 20 April.] It is expected that the current effort to make the Warsaw Pact a more effective military alliance will continue with similar exercises in other satellites later this year. 25X1

25X1

Yugoslavia-USSR: Yugoslav officials, according to the US Embassy, appear pleased with the Gromyko visit of 16-21 April but admit that tangible results such as greater economic cooperation will probably remain dependent on the political situation.

25X1

[Although there is no indication that Gromyko discussed military matters during his visit, a Yugoslav Defense Ministry official on 18 April told the US army attaché that Belgrade had decided to purchase unspecified types and amounts of military equipment from the USSR. He insisted, however, that this would not represent a change in Yugoslav political orientation. Except for several helicopters, this would be the first Yugoslav purchase of Soviet military equipment since the 1948 break with the Cominform. The decision apparently results from a shortage of foreign currency with which to buy equipment in Western Europe. Belgrade has, on the other hand, a trade credit with the USSR estimated at \$20 million.]

23 Apr 62

DAILY BRIEF

v

25X1

25X1

Greek Politics Embittered by Opposition Campaign
Of Demonstrations

[The major charge which Center Union leader George Papandreu and his associates are making in their campaign is that widespread corruption and intimidation accompanied the parliamentary elections last October, in which Premier Karamanlis' right-of-center party won 176 of the 300 seats and over 50 percent of the popular vote. Most American observers regard the elections as having been neither more nor less corrupt than others in recent years.]

25X1

(Regarding the widely publicized Center Union rally on 20 April, the American Embassy in Athens reports that the only significant disorders occurred after Papandreu had concluded a half-hour speech and his audience had dispersed from a cordoned-off area in downtown Athens. Organized leftists, including Communist-tainted construction workers, provoked violence by smashing windows in one area while small groups of demonstrators elsewhere chanted slogans. About one hundred demonstrators suffered minor injuries during the window-smashing episode, and some 400 persons were arrested.)

[The Communist-dominated United Democratic Left, which suffered a severe setback in the October elections, has been seeking ever since to gain respectability by associating itself with the Center Union's campaign. Papandreu, who has publicly rejected Communist offers of support, has indicated that further rallies are planned. These will give the extreme left further opportunities for violence.]

[At the same time that it has been encouraged by the attention its campaign is receiving, the center leadership is probably increasingly frustrated by the absence of any real lever to use on the King or the government. Karamanlis' parliamentary

position is still good, although the government lost a recent by-election, and the royal family is still strongly supporting him.]


[The government itself, however, may be tempted to play up the danger from Papandreu's campaign in at least two ways: it may clamp down heavily on overt opposition activity with the justification that it must enforce maximum security for the forthcoming NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Athens, and it may cite the opposition campaign as another reason why the recent NATO "Wise Men's" report on Greece's economic situation is politically unacceptable. The government fears this report could be used by its opponents to claim that Greece will be discriminated against in the allocation of future Western aid.]

25X1



25X1

25X1



THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U. S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Warning Center

The Director

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET